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APPLYING THE LAW OF FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
TO BANKRUPT LEVERAGED BUYOUTS: THE




Today's financial age has become a period of unbri-
dled excess with accepted risk soaring out of proportion
to possible reward. Every week, with ever-increasing
levels of irresponsibility, many billions of dollars in Ameri-
can assets are being saddled with debt that has virtually
no chance of being repaid. Most of this is happening for
the short-term benefit of Wall Street's investment bank-
ers, lawyers, leveraged buyout firms and junk-bond deal-
ers at the long-term expense of Main Street's employees,
communities, companies and investors.
They forgo all significant covenant protection and
ignore all warnings of "caveat emptor." Boom-time opti-
mism, not thoughtful credit analysis, is their guiding light.
And in a bankruptcy, their holdings will almost certainly
be wiped out.'
As to the last statement, such were the quite prophetic words of
Ted Forstmann, a founder and senior partner of Forstmann Little
& Company, one of the nation's first, and most successful, lever-
aged buyout firms. His commentary above was memorialized as
"The Spiel" in Barbarians at the Gate, the saga of the battle to
take over RJR Nabisco, Inc. in a leveraged buyout.2 And as the
epilogue to that tome informs us:
* The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author.
** Mr. Sahino is a graduate of St. John's University School of Law (J.D. 1983) and St.
John's University College of Business Administration (B.S. 1980). He was formerly Judicial
Law Clerk to the Honorable D. Joseph Devito, United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of New Jersey. Admitted to practice in the states of New York and Pennsylvania,
Mr. Sabino is presently associated with the New York City law firm of Marks & Murase. He
is also an adjunct Professor of Law at St. John's University College of Business
Administration.
The author dedicates this writing to Mary Jane Sabino, Esquire, with deepest thanks for
providing the inspiration for this article.
1. Theodore J. Forstmann, 'Leveraged to the Hilt' - Violating Our Rules of Prudence,
WALL ST. J., Oct. 25, 1988, at A26 (emphasis added).
2. See BRYAN BURROUCH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE GATE-THE FALL OF
RJR NABISCO 258 (1990).
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The first eight months of 1989 saw $4 billion worth of
junk-bond defaults and debt moratoriums, the most spec-
tacular being the troubles of Canadian entrepreneur Rob-
ert Campeau's retail empire. Then, in October, the
unraveling of a $6.79 billion buyout of United Airlines'
parent prompted momentary panic on Wall Street, send-
ing the Dow Jones Industrial Average down nearly 200
points and prompting fears of a new market crash.
Ted Forstmann, of course, felt thoroughly vindicated.3
It is therefore fitting that the zenith of the buyout craze of the
1980s also marked the day of a turning point in its own demise.
On December 1, 1988, the financial press announced to the world
that Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Company had succeeded in its
leveraged buyout bid to purchase RJR Nabisco, Inc., for the stag-
gering sum of over $25 billion.4 The RJR Nabisco transaction rep-
resented the pinnacle of leverage buyouts (LBOs). It was more
than quadruple the size of the next largest LBO on record at that
time, that of Beatrice Companies for over $6 billion. Indeed, it
was a fitting climax to a year that witnessed LBO acquisitions
totaling an astronomical $67 billion in value.5
Yet, while the mavens of Wall Street reveled in the glory of
this megadeal, that same day a federal court in Illinois issued a
decision representing a turning point in a series of judicial opin-
ions dealing with a force even greater than the behemoth LBOs.
That irresistable force was the Bankruptcy Code, particularly its
laws on fraudulent conveyances, as applied to LBOs of companies
which subsequently became bankrupt. That still-evolving clash of
the titans is the subject of this writing.
As shall be demonstrated hereinbelow, while the world of
high finance was gripped in its frenzy of leveraged buyouts, each
one more spectacular and excessive than the last, tremendous
forces in the law were working toward making their own startling
appearance. Like a tidal wave, with its mammoth energy primar-
ily submerged and thus unseen, various courts were quietly mar-
shaling centuries-old law prohibiting conveyances in fraud of
creditors, and were beginning to tentatively apply them to
overleveraged buyouts that had subsequently filed bankruptcy.
Then, in a great onslaught that coincided with the flight of
3. Id. at 513.
4. WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1988, at p. 1, cl. 2.
5. Id. See also Colin P. Cross, Intangible Assets: Extra Comfort for the LBO Lender,
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Nov./Dec. 1988, at 50.
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failed LBOs to the supposed shelter of the bankruptcy court, a
large number of tribunals finally emerged, espousing the applica-
tion of the ancient fraudulent conveyance law to the creations of
Wall Street's wunderkinds. Thus began the great revolution in
this realm, with case law advocating the unraveling of these failed
LBOs, and a return of the massive payouts to the debtor for an
eventual distribution to their creditors. The above view of the
law, which puts existing and contemplated LBOs at risk of greater
scrutiny, now generally prevails.
This view, however, is not without opposition. At least one
circuit court has decided that failed LBOs need not be undone and
the earlier payouts to shareholders may rest undisturbed. 6 While
the result is diametrically opposed to the majority view, interest-
ingly enough it has been founded upon a very different perspec-
tive of which precepts of law control here. Needless to say, the
inter-circuit dichotomy is, at present, the most critical aspect of
this issue, and may yet be addressed by the Supreme Court or
Congress.
In any event, having posited the conflict between courts
favoring the application of fraudulent conveyance law to LBOs
and those who have not, this article shall proceed to analyze that
schism, by first examining the basic underlying statutory provi-
sions in force, as well as their medieval forebearers; tracing the
genesis of the cases initially forging these principles; and then
espousing in full the many recent decisions that have applied the
law of fraudulent conveyances to failed LBOs, including the lone
tribunal in opposition thereto. This writing shall conclude with a
few thoughts for the future on this highly controversial subject.
II. TODAY'S WALL STREET VERSUS YESTERDAY'S
ELIZABETHAN LAW
Looking to the long-standing laws of fraudulent conveyances,
as enforceable under the modern Bankruptcy Code, creditors and
bankruptcy trustees alike have attacked the transfers appurtenant
to a leveraged buyout.7 They have done so by claiming that the
resulting transfers, among other things, were lacking in the
receipt of fair consideration by the target in exchange for the bur-
6. See, e.g., In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 952 F.2d 1230, 1237 (9th Cir. 1991).
7. In reorganization cases proceeding under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, the
"debtor in possession [has] all the rights... and powers, and shall perform all the functions
and duties ... of a trustee ...." 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (1988). For that reason, the terms are
virtually interchangeable, and, as shall be seen herein, it is just as often the debtor in
possession that acts as plaintiff in these litigations.
1993]
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den of the new LBO debt or, likewise, alleging the LBO transfer
rendered the target insolvent.
While today's fraudulent conveyance action is prosecuted
under the modern Bankruptcy Code, its history extends back far
longer:
The present law of fraudulent conveyances has
ancient roots. Section 548 is derived from the Statute of
13 Elizabeth passed by Parliament in 1571. The statute
was aimed at a practice by which overburdened debtors
placed their assets in friendly hands thereby frustrating
creditors' attempts to satisfy their claims against the
debtor. After the creditors had abandoned the effort to
recover on their claims, the debtor would obtain a recon-
veyance of the property that had been transferred. Such
transactions operated as a fraud against the debtor's cred-
itors because the debtor's estate was depleted without
exchanging property of similar value from which the
creditors' claims could be satisfied.8
Section 548 of the Bankruptcy Code specifies the circum-
stances under which a conveyance may be considered fraudulent,
and thus avoidable. Section 548(aXl) requires actual fraudulent
intent, while § 548(aX2) is a constructive fraud provision. Under
this latter section, a transfer is conclusively presumed to be fraudu-
lent when certain conditions are met.9
In many instances, a transaction cannot be challenged as a
fraudulent conveyance under the Bankruptcy Code because it
occurred more than one year before the bankruptcy case was
8. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 644-45 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992).
9. In relevant part, 11 U.S.C § 548(a) reads as follows:
(a) The trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property, or any
obligation incurred by the debtor, that was made or incurred on or within one year before
the date of the filing of the petition, if the debtor voluntarily or involuntarily-
(1) made such transfer or incurred such obligation with actual intent to hinder,
delay, or defraud any entity to which the debtor was or became, on or after the
date that such transfer was made or such obligation was incurred, indebted; or
(2XA) received less than a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for such
transfer or obligation; and
(BXi) was insolvent on the date that such transfer was made or such obligation
was incurred, or became insolvent as a result of such transfer or obligation;
(ii) was engaged in business or a transaction, or was about to engage in business
or a transaction, for which any property remaining with the debtor was an
unreasonably small capital; or
(iii) intended to incur, or believed that the debtor would incur, debts that
would be beyond the debtor's ability to pay as such debts matured.
11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (1988). Generally, the trustee's ability to commence an avoidance lawsuit
is subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 11 U.S.C. § 546(aX1) (1988).
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filed.' ° Accordingly, attention has traditionally .been focused on
state fraudulent conveyance law."' Section 544 of the Bankruptcy
Code permits a trustee to "avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is
voidable under applicable law .... 12 This is the avenue by which
a trustee can invoke state fraudulent conveyance law.13 While the
trustee's powers to undo fraudulent conveyances are formidable,
they are not absolute. The Bankruptcy Code has carefully carved
out exceptions to the avoidance process. These exceptions were
promulgated to preserve the finality of certain specified transac-
tions. Pertinent to the instant discussion are the exceptions to the
avoiding power created for so-called "settlement payments" made
in securities transactions.
Although a tacit part of the Bankruptcy Code since its promul-
gation in 1978, these subsequent amendments enacted in 1982 are
germane to this inquiry. Most importantly, one must consider the
context of these amendments. At the time of their passage, Con-
gress was concerned about the volatile nature of the commodities
and securities markets and decided that certain protections were
necessary to prevent "the insolvency of one commodity or security
firm from spreading to other firms and possibly threatening the
collapse of the affected market."' 4 As stated in legislative history:
The Bankruptcy Code now expressly provides certain
protections to the commodities market to protect against
such a 'ripple effect.' One of the market protections pres-
ently contained in the Bankruptcy Code, for example,
prevents a trustee in bankruptcy from avoiding or setting
aside, as a preferential transfer, margin payments made
10. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).
11. In re Revco D.S., Inc., 118 B.R. 468, 474 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1990).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
13. Ferrari v. Barclays Business Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 108 B.R. 389, 389
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1989). The various individual codifications of fraudulent transfer law are
generally modeled after either the Uniform Fradulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) or the
Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA), provoking a substantial similarity among the
fora. See N.Y. DEBT. & CRED. §§ 270 to 281 (McKinney 1990) (UFCA); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 13-02.1-01 to 13-02.1-10 (1991) (UFTA); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 513.41 to 513.51 (West
1990) (UFTA); CAL. CIv. CODE §§ 3439 to 3439.12 (West 1971 & Supp. 1993) (UFTA). The
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has noted that "'[t]he fradulent conveyance
provisions of the Code are modeled on the UFCA, and uniform interpretation of the two
states [is] essential to promote commerce nationally ... ' United States v. Tabor Court
Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1299 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nor., McClellan Realty
Co. v. United States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987) (citing Cohen v. Sutherland, 257 F.2d 737, 741
(2d Cir. 1958)). See Cohen, 257 F.2d at 741 (the Bankruptcy Code's fradulent conveyance
provision is the "federal codification" of the UFCA).
14. H. R. REP. No. 420, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
583 [hereinafter HOUSE REPORT].
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to a commodity broker.15
Yet Congress wanted to go further to protect margin pay-
ments and settlement payments made by and to participants in
the securities market generally. Accordingly, it added a new sub-
section to § 546, subsection (e) of the statute. 16 As explicitly set
forth in the legislative history, the thrust of this amendment was to
extend protection to the securities market by ensuring that the
avoiding powers of a bankruptcy trustee are not construed to per-
mit settlement payments to be set aside, except in cases of fraud.' 7
Notably, the explanation of the individual provision speaks of "a
settlement payment made by a clearing organization . .1.8."
Almost by definition, an LBO acquisition is a financial mecha-
nism that will inevitably collide head-on with the common law and
statutes relating to creditors' rights, which trace their roots back to
the 13th century, because it severely encumbers assets of a com-
pany to benefit transferring shareholders while revising down-
ward the creditworthiness of the company for existing creditors.
Existing creditors originally loaned money on one basis; the highly
leveraged post-LBO company now presents a completely different
credit risk to lenders.
A leverage buyout typically consists of the purchase of a cor-
poration, the "target," from its shareholders by an investment
entity, known as the "acquiror." The acquiror finances the
purchase with proceeds from debt, loaned on the basis of the giv-
ing of the target's assets as collateral security, and a de minimis
equity investment.' 9 The fulcrum of the deal is the leveraging of
all or most of the target's assets to secure the borrowing, the debt
is typically massive in comparison to the equity put in by the
acquiror; hence the term "leveraged."
The direct economic effect of the LBO on the acquired com-
pany is clear-after the LBO, the sum total of its assets is
unchanged, but it is now heavily mortgaged. A huge debt must be
serviced, but its beneficial proceeds were transferred not to the
target, but to its former shareholders. In the eyes of creditors, the
15. Id. (citation omitted).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (1988). Originally, the clause was added as subsection (d) to
§ 546, but was renumbered when further amendments were promulgated in later years.
Bankruptcy Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-222, 96 Stat. 236 (1982), reprinted in
1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 235, 236.
17. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 14, at 2, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 583.
18. Id. at 3, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 585.
19. See Matthew T. Kirby et al., Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged
Buyout Lending, 43 Bus. LAW. 27, 27 n.3.
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target has been substantially weakened in terms of its
creditworthiness. The general creditors now are confronted with
a greatly diminished asset pool to look to for a recovery should the
company fail. In addition, those creditors will stand behind the
secured LBO lenders in any forced distribution. Obviously, the
highly leveraged company represents a scenario in which no gen-
eral creditor desires to be caught. Consequently, they have sought
redress when an LBO target, unable to fulfill its increased financial
burdens, succumbs to bankruptcy.
There exists a school of legal thought that failed LBOs in bank-
ruptcy should never be subjected to the law of fraudulent convey-
ances. At least two leading academicians have staunchly
advocated a more restrictive reading of the laws of the fraudulent
conveyance today, in light of the modern financial world's degree
of sophistication in both the legal and economic aspects of the
debtor-creditor relationship.2 °
Pertinent here is the specific promulgation of the notion that
LBOs are undeserving of attack under the historical concepts of
fraudulent conveyances. "It is not clear," state Professors Baird
and Jackson, "that permitting the debtor to engage in a leveraged
buyout, for instance, is against the long-term interests of the credi-
tors as a group. ' 21 Indeed, they assert that the buyout may bring
about a more streamlined and effective organization, better able
to service its debt.22 Among other things, a privately-held entity
has immediate savings by doing away with the necessity of com-
plying with federal securities reporting requirements.2 3
The learned commentators claim that today's LBO is far dif-
ferent from the old "Elizabethan deadbeat who sells his sheep to
his brother for a pittance. ' 24 In their view, the typical LBO simply
lacks the element of genuine fraud from which the laws of fraudu-
lent conveyances were designed to protect creditors.25
Lastly, in a "whipsaw" analogy, Professors Baird and Jackson
cry out against any law that gives general creditors too much by
insuring them against all less-than-satisfactory transactions into
20. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its
Proper Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
21. Id. at 833.
22. Id. at 853.
23. Id. (citing Jenny B. Wahl & Edward T. Wahl, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and
Leveraged Buyout: Remedy or Insurance Policy?, 16 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 343, 358 n.41
(1990)).
24. Baird & Jackson, supra note 20, at 852.
25. Id.
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which a debtor may enter.2 6 A just and proper application of
fraudulent conveyance law in the context of LBOs would activate
those provisions only where there were suspicious attributes to the
transaction. Otherwise, the LBO is no different from any other
business activity, with both the potential of risks and benefits to be
borne by the company and its creditors alike.
Against this statutory and academic backdrop, we may now
proceed to examine the evolution of the doctrine that has led to
the acceptance of the applicability of fraudulent conveyance law
to failed leveraged buyouts. Indeed, its formative beginnings tell
us much.
III. THE PIONEERING DECISIONS
The decision to apply the law of fraudulent conveyances to
today's LBOs was not easily reached. Early cases in this realm
reflect judicial uncertainty as to how to deal with the modern
dynamics of corporate finance, as represented by leveraged
buyouts, when they clash with long established fraudulent convey-
ance law as applied in bankruptcy proceedings.
In Kupetz v. Wolf,28 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's determination that the LBO of the debtor
was not a fraudulent conveyance. 29 There, the acquiror incorpo-
rated with only de minimis capital and purchased all of the
debtor's shares for $3 million.3' The acquisition was financed with
a $1.1 million loan and $1.9 million in letters of credit from its
lender, and the target company's assets were pledged to the bank
to secure those obligations. 31 Unable to service its debt, the com-
pany filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7, slightly
over two years after the acquisition. 32 Subsequently, the bank-
ruptcy trustee filed a complaint alleging the underlying transac-
26. Id. at 843. See, e.g., Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating
Co.), 91 B.R. 430, 441 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988) ("While transfers between a purchaser and
the target company in an LBO ought to be subject to avoidance as a fraudulent transfer, a
purchaser in an LBO transaction should not be required to be an insurer of the ultimate
success of the purchased enterprise, except by legislative action determining public
economic policy.")
27. The modern Bankruptcy Code was promulgated via the passage of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 101, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5807. Obviously, the Code itself was still in its infancy as LBOs began to
take hold of Wall Street.
28. 845 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1988).
29. Kupetz v. Wolf, 845 F.2d 842, 850 (9th Cir. 1988).
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tions were fraudulent conveyances.33 The federal district court
directed a verdict denying those claims and the trustee
appealed.3 4
The appellate tribunal expressed its frustration with the issue
from the outset, opining that "LBOs pose difficult issues when the
purchased corporation becomes bankrupt. . . . As some of the
acquired companies have failed, creditors have begun to assert
that LBOs are fraudulent .... On that point, the panel pointed
out that the application of fraudulent conveyance law to LBOs
gives creditors the ability to "whipsaw" companies, taking advan-
tage of successful LBOs and commencing a fraudulent conveyance
lawsuit if the LBO fails.36
With this embryonic principle in mind, the court declined to
apply the fraudulent conveyance laws in this context. As its
rationale, it first held there was no evidence of any intentional
fraud worked by the selling shareholder on the target's creditors.3 8
Second, these shareholders did not know the acquiror intended to
finance his buyout via an LBO.3 9 Third, the trustee was not repre-
senting the interests of pre-LBO creditors, who obviously lacked a
full-fledged opportunity to evaluate the effect of the leveraged
buyout on the target's creditworthiness. 40 Lastly, the form of the
LBO represented a sale of stock to an entity other than the target
itself, a critical distinction in the panel's view.4 '
Notably, the tribunal looked to various underlying facts in sup-
port of these holdings. The appellate judges found that the seller
shareholders acted in good faith throughout the transaction and
had sold their stock at a fair price.42 The acquiror, albeit thinly
capitalized, was backed by the substantial personal assets of its
principal and a relationship with a substantially sound major
money center bank.43
Most interesting was the panel's acknowledgment that a lack
of intent does not necessarily bar a fraudulent conveyance claim
33. Id.
34. Kupetz, 845 F.2d at 844-45.
35. Id. at 845-46.
36. Id. at 847 n.10.
37. Id. at 847.
38. Id. at 848.
39. Kupetz, 845 F.2d at 848. The court found the distinction set forth above significant
because in many LBOs, the target buys back its own stock in an attempt to go "'private" like
RJR Nabisco.
40. Id. at 849.
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because of the "constructive" fraud provisions of that law." How-
ever, the tribunal backed away from that point, stating: "we hesi-
tate to utilize constructive intent to frustrate the purposes
intended to be served by what appears to us to be a legitimate
LBO."4 Furthermore, the court struck a cautionary note in
adding: "[n]or do we think it appropriate to utilize constructive
intent to brand most, if not all, LBOs as illegitimate. We cannot
believe that virtually all LBOs are designed to 'hinder, delay, or
defraud creditors.' "46
A sharp contrast to the preceding case is found in United
States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp.47 There, the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit was compelled to examine an intricate lever-
aged buyout and decide whether the mortgages given in that
transaction were fraudulent conveyances within the meaning of
the intentional and constructive fraud provisions of the Penn-
sylvania Uniform Fraudulent Conveyances Act.48  The panel
noted that its decision was "the first significant application of the
UFCA to leveraged buyout financing. '' a4
In Tabor Court, the appellate court was greatly troubled by
the nature of the LBO. The panel looked to the facts that: (1) the
target's stock was purchased with large funds borrowed at an
extremely high rate of interest;5" (2) the assets of the target and its
subsidiaries were mortgaged to secure those borrowings;5 1 (3) the
acquiring company was seemingly an empty shell, able only to
perform the LBO on the strength of the massive aforementioned
loan; 2 (4) the ominous presence of "secret partners" as the princi-
pals of the acquiror;53 and (5) the existence of multi-million dollar
liabilities on the books of the target at the time of the LBO.5 4
Indeed, the court found this LBO to be "anything but unsus-
picious." 5 The severe economic distress the target was put in,
without a concomitant benefit, coupled with the lack of fair con-
sideration to the debtor in this LBO, suggested the transaction was
44. See Kupetz, 845 F.2d at 848.
45. Kupetz, 845 F.2d at 848.
46. Id.
47. 803 F.2d 1288 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom., McClellan Realty Co. v. United
States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
48. United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288, 1291 (3d Cir. 1986), cert.
denied sub nom., McClellan Realty Co. v. United States, 483 U.S. 1005 (1987).
49. Id. at 1291.
50. Id. at 1292.
51. Id. at 1292-93.
52. Id. at 1292.
53. Tabor Court, 803 F.2d at 1292.
54. Id. at 1293.
55. Id. at 1297.
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not made in the ordinary course.56
Based upon the foregoing circumstances, the tribunal deter-
mined that the LBO was indeed a fraudulent conveyance because
it rendered the target insolvent, as neither the target nor any of its
subsidiaries received fair consideration in the transaction.5 7 In so
finding, the Third Circuit explicitly concluded that the law of
fraudulent conveyances applied to this LBO. The court found that
the "broad sweep" of the fraudulent conveyance law did not jus-
tify the exclusion of LBOs simply because they were innovative
and complex. 58 The tribunal determined that any exemption for
leveraged buyouts should be carved out by the legislature, not by
the judiciary. 9
Notwithstanding the apparent misgivings expressed by the
Ninth Circuit in Kupetz, it was the Tabor Court rationale of the
Third Circuit that seemed to encourage the subsequent applica-
tion of fraudulent conveyance law to failed LBOs. In Ohio Corru-
gating Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit (In re Ohio
Corrugating Co.),6° the creditors' committee brought an action
alleging, among other things, that the transfer by the debtor of a
security interest for purposes of a leveraged buyout was both an
actual and constructive fraudulent conveyance under § 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code and the UFCA.6 1
The defendants moved for summary judgment arguing, inter
alia, that "as long as some entity received a reasonably equivalent
value for the incurring of the loan obligation or the transferring of
a security interest, Plaintiff's case must fail regardless of whether
[the debtor] benefitted from the transaction. '62 Although the
court granted summary judgment for the defendant on the actual
fraud allegations, the court rejected the defendants' argument on
constructive fraud in this fashion: "An analysis of an allegedly
fraudulent transfer must be directed at what the Debtor surren-
dered and what the Debtor received, irrespective of what any
third party may have gained or lost. The rationale of the fraudu-
56. Id.
57. Id. at 1296.
58. Tabor Court, 803 F.2d at 1297.
59. Id. followed by Moody v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 127 B.R. 958 (W.D.
Pa. 1991). In Moody, District Judge Diamond held that the application of fraudulent
conveyance law to LBOs "is mandated" by Tabor Court, and the Third Circuit's ruling
therein was not meant "to encourage district court forays into legislating exceptions for
some leveraged buyouts and not others." Moody, 127 B.R. at 989 n.7.
60. 70 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
61. Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.),
70 B.R. 920, 923 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987).
62. Id. at 927.
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lent transfer provision of the Code is to preserve the assets of the
estate. "63
Other courts have found that improper payments made by a
debtor either to selling shareholders or lenders in an LBO deal
must be avoided. In Vadnais Lumber Supply, Inc. v. Byrne (In re
Vadnais Lumber Supply),64 a corporation purchased its own
shares from four shareholders for $100,000 and paid an additional
$300,000 for the selling shareholders' limited covenants not to
compete.65 The court held that the cash paid to the shareholders
and the obligations for future installment payments incurred by
the corporation were fraudulent conveyances under the Bank-
ruptcy Code.66 Therefore, the court discharged the debtor from
all obligations to make future payments and allowed the estate to
recover all the cash payments made at or after the closing.67
In Ferrari v. Barclays Business Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool,
Inc.), 8 the court considered whether future creditors of the
debtor had standing to assert a fraudulent conveyance action
under the Massachusetts UFCA. 9 The tribunal examined a
number of policy considerations raised by commentators and
courts which have addressed the issue for not applying fraudulent
conveyance laws to leveraged buyouts. Commentators argued
that:
[L]everaged buy-outs... will be discouraged if the courts
apply fraudulent conveyance laws to them indiscrimi-
nately; that leveraged buy-outs are not the kinds of trans-
actions that fraudulent conveyance laws (neither 13 Eliz.
ch. 5 nor the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act) were
intended to deter and remedy; that creditors can protect
themselves from leveraged buy-outs by... contracting to
prohibit them; and that future creditors who extend[ ]
credit knowing of the buyout should not be able to use
fraudulent conveyance laws as insurance policies for
failed LBOs.
70
The Ferrari court concluded, however, that:
63. Id. (citing Martin v. Phillips (In re Butcher), 58 B.R. 128 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1986)).
64. 100 B.R. 127 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
65. Vadnais Lumber Supply v. Byrne (In re Vadnais Lumber Supply), 100 B.R. 127, 130
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
66. Id. at 137.
67. Id. at 141.
68. 108 B.R. 389 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
69. Ferrari v. Barclays Business Credit, Inc. (In re Morse Tool, Inc.), 108 B.R. 389, 389
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1989).
70. Id. at 390-91.
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These arguments have some merit, but so do the counter-
arguments: for example, that not all leveraged buy-outs
have social utility or benefit for creditors, and fraudulent
conveyance laws may help deter or redress the worst of
them; that few creditors have the bargaining power to
prevent the debtor from engaging in an LBO; that many
trade creditors and other future creditors do not and can-
not, in the normal course of business, perform a solvency
or cash-flow analysis of the debtor before extending
credit; and that involuntary future creditors (such as tax-
ing authorities and tort creditors) do not have freedom to
decide whether to extend credit to the target of an
LBO.7 1
Most recently, in Aluminum Mills Corp. v. Citicorp North
America, Inc. (In re Aluminum Mills Corp. ),72 United States Bank-
ruptcy Judge Schmetter said that although a relatively small
number of courts have written on the subject, they have uniformly
held that transfers to and between debtors and their LBO lenders,
controlling shareholders, and companies owned by those share-
holders, are subject to both the Bankruptcy Code and state fraudu-
lent conveyance statutes.73 Judge Schmetter went on to state that
"[t]here is no reason to go against this established precedent."74
There, the court denied actions to dismiss fraudulent conveyance
lawsuits by the unsecured creditors, thus allowing those actions to
proceed. As opined by Bankruptcy Judge Bodoh in Ohio Corru-
gating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.):
75
The fact that fraudulent conveyance law originally did
not envision its use to avoid LBOs is not important. The
very essence of common law is its adaptability to unique
situations and changing fact patterns. If the rights of
creditors have been impaired, we see no reason to except
LBOs from the operation of fraudulent conveyance law if
the transfers otherwise fit within the statutory
framework.76
71. Id. at 391. See also Anderson Indus., Inc. v. Anderson (In re Anderson Indus., Inc.),
55 B.R. 922 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1985).
72. 132 B.R. 869 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991).
73. Aluminum Mills Corp. v. Citicorp North America, Inc. (In re Aluminum Mills
Corp.), 132 B.R. 869, 885 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (footnotes omitted).
74. Id.
75. 91 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
76. Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re Ohio Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430, 433
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
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Judge Bodoh added that any suggestion that LBOs should be
exempt from such provisions "is largely a policy matter which is
most appropriately left to the consideration of Congress and state
legislatures."77 Although the court found that the creditors suing
on behalf of the debtor did not carry the evidentiary burden of
proving that the LBO was a fraudulent conveyance, the court
affirmed the notion that an LBO could still be scrutinized under
the state fraudulent conveyance statutes.78
In sum, the Ninth Circuit in Kupetz, while not fully advocat-
ing the point, at least opened the door to the application of fraudu-
lent conveyance law to failed LBOs. Tabor Court was by far the
most influential case of its time, but since it was grounded upon
such egregious facts, its future value as precedent was still unclear
until further cases heightened its utility. Nevertheless, it did trig-
ger a groundswell of support for its doctrine in the lower courts,
and these decisions then helped define the parameters for what
was yet to come. And come it did indeed.
IV. THE TURNING POINT
The seminal case which spearheaded this ground-breaking
body of law, decided on the same day the world awoke to the
"Mother of all LBOs," was Wieboldt Stores, Inc. v. Schottenstein.79
Wieboldt, the debtor in a Chapter 11 reorganization proceeding,
filed its complaint against 119 defendants alleging, among other
things, that Wieboldt's leveraged buyout, by a specially formed
acquisition corporation in 1985, constituted a fraudulent convey-
ance.8 o Specifically, Wieboldt contended that the LBO reduced
the assets available to its creditors, increased its debt burden by
millions of dollars, and left Wieboldt insolvent and without suffi-
cient unencumbered assets to sustain its business and ensure the
making of payments due unsecured creditors.8 1
The defendants in this case were grouped into three non-
exclusive categories: (1) controlling shareholders, officers and
directors; (2) the lenders who funded the leveraged buyout (the
LBO lenders); and (3) other shareholders who owned more than
1,000 shares of Wieboldt and had tendered their shares in the
LBO.12 The instant matter came before the court on numerous
77. Id. at 434.
78. Id. at 440.
79. 94 B.R. 488 (N.D. Ill. 1988).




FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES & LBOs
motions by these defendants to have the complaint dismissed. 3
As for the underlying LBO transaction itself, Wieboldt was a
Chicago-based retail concern in declining financial health. 4 In
January of 1985, unable to pay current obligations, Wieboldt
agreed to be acquired via a tender offer made by WSI Acquisition
Corporation. WSI intended to finance its leveraged buyout by
pledging substantially all of Wieboldt's assets, particularly real
property, which was already serving as collateral for obligations
upon which Wieboldt was at least partially in default at the time.
85
When the sale of Wieboldt's major piece of real estate did not
generate sufficient funds to extinguish its pre-LBO obligations,
WSI sought additional monies by selling the company's customer
charge accounts, pledging all accounts receivable and subjecting
the remaining real estate holdings to either first or second mort-
gages.8  Notably, by the time of the buyout, the LBO lenders had
full knowledge of the loan or credit commitments of WSI to each
one of them.8 7 Moreover, the board of directors of Wieboldt
understood that WSI intended to pledge substantially all of Wie-
boldt's assets to fund the transaction, without using any of its own
funds. The board also knew that the proceeds from the LBO lend-
ers would not increase working capital. Nevertheless, the tender
offer was approved, and by the end of 1985, WSI had acquired
ownership of 99% of Wieboldt's stock. 8
The following September, some of Wieboldt's aggrieved cred-
itors commenced an involuntary liquidation proceeding against
the company. 9 On September 24, 1986, Wieboldt filed a volun-
tary petition for reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Acting now as a debtor-in-possession, Wieboldt filed
a lawsuit, alleging that the LBO had worked a fraud on its
unsecured creditors.9 ° The court in Wieboldt examined the prece-
dents of Tabor Court, Kupetz, and others for guidance-surely a
mixed lot of decisions.91
In deciding this case, District Judge Holderman rejected the
assertion of the defendants that the law of fraudulent conveyances
83. Id. at 492.
84. Id. at 494.
85. Wieboldt, 94 B.R. at 494-95.
86. Id. at 495.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 496.
90. Wieboldt, 94 B.R. at 496.
91. See id. at 500-02.
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did not apply to leveraged buyouts.9" He did so based on primar-
ily two grounds. First, the court found that the language of the
Bankruptcy Code itself "in no way limits [its] application so as to
exclude LBOs."9' The definition of a "transfer" of property found
in the Code and the statute invalidating a fraudulent transfer were
both found to be very broad. Therefore, the court found no basis
for finding an exemption for leveraged buyouts.94 Second, the
court looked to the rulings of its brethren and found that "those
courts which have addressed this issue have concluded that LBOs
in some circumstances may constitute a fraudulent conveyance.
95
Having thus decided that a leveraged buyout can be deemed
a fraudulent conveyance, Judge Holderman analyzed the Wie-
boldt buyout. The defendants claimed that this LBO was com-
posed of "a series of interrelated but independent transactions,"
and that they were the transferees of the property of the acquiror,
WSI, and not the debtor. Wieboldt, in turn, urged the court to
consider WSI as a mere conduit of its property, and therefore col-
lapse the LBO and treat it as one aggregate transfer to the defend-
ants.96 It was the latter view that the court adopted.97
Crucial in Wieboldt was the court's conclusion that the com-
plaint alleged sufficient facts to demonstrate that the controlling
shareholders entered into the transaction with the full knowledge
that WSI was not using any of its own funds, that the leveraged
buyout would result in the further encumbrance of already
encumbered assets, and that Wieboldt was insolvent. 98 The LBO
lenders were likewise implicated, said the court, because they had
the same knowledge as the controlling shareholders, and they too
"were well aware of each other's loan or credit commitments to
WSI," which had financed the LBO.99 Furthermore, the court
agreed that WSI served "mainly as a conduit" for the transfer of
92. Id. at 499-500.
93. Id. at 499.
94. Id.
95. Wieboldt, 94 B.R. at 499 (citations omitted).
96. Id. at 500.
97. Id. at 502, followed by Moody v. Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 127 B.R. 958,
991 (W.D. Pa. 1991). See Murphy v. Meritor Sav. Bank (In re O'Day Corp.), 126 B.R. 370
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1991). Observing that "courts not infrequently 'collapse' the discrete steps
employed by the parties" in structuring an LBO, Bankruptcy Judge Gabriel agreed to
examine the substance of a failed LBO "as one transaction." Id. at 394. Moreover, the
court acknowledged that while its fraudulent conveyance analysis may not be a simple task,
when the target assumes liabilities or gives security interests and the LBO consideration is
"immediately passed to target's shareholders or third parties then the lack of fair
consideration may be equally evident." Id.
98. Wieboldt, 94 B.R. at 502-03.
99. Id. at 502.
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Wieboldt assets to the controlling shareholders and the LBO
lenders. 10 0
Applying the principle espoused by other tribunals that "a
court should focus not on the formal structure of the transaction
but rather on the knowledge or intent of the parties involved," the
court decided to collapse the LBO into one unified transaction. 10 1
"In sum," ruled Judge Holderman, "the formal structure of the
transaction alone cannot shield the LBO lenders or the controlling
shareholders from Wieboldt's fraudulent conveyance
claims. "102 For these reasons, the defendants' motions to dismiss
the case were denied, and the fraudulent conveyance complaint
was left standing for an eventual trial.1
0 3
In a later ruling, District Judge Holderman subsequently cut
off another avenue of escape for various defendants in Raleigh v.
Schottenstein (In re Wieboldt Stores, Inc. ),104 in which he denied
the motions of certain defendants to dismiss, or alternatively, for
partial summary judgment. 105 These defendants had tendered
their Wieboldt shareholdings in the LBO, and argued that the
payouts they had received were "settlement payments" not sub-
ject to avoidance by a trustee under the Bankruptcy Code.' 6
Their stake was not insignificant; these defendants had tendered
nearly half a million of the debtor's shares to the buyout entity,1
0 7
and benefitted by a payout of nearly $6.5 million from the LBO.10 1
The district court rejected the argument that the trustee was
barred from avoiding these so-called settlement payments.' 0 9
Commencing with the law itself, Judge Holderman found that
"the language of the statute is not dispositive in determining
100. Id. at 503.
101. Id. at 502.
102. Id. at 503.
103. Wieboldt, 94 B.R. at 503-04.
104. 131 B.R. 655 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The Wieboldt trustee, Thomas Raleigh, now
stepped in to prosecute this action for the debtor. Id.
105. Raleigh v. Schottenstein (In re Wieboldt Stores, Inc.), 131 B.R. 655, 662 (N.D. Ill.
1991).
106. Id. at 663. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (Supp. III 1991). The text itself reads:
Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(aX2), and 548(b) of this title the
trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in section
101(34), 741(5), or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined in
section 101(35) or 741(8) of this title, made by or to a commodity broker, forward
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing
agency, that is made before the commencement of the case, except under
section 548(aX1) of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 546(e).
107. Raleigh, 131 B.R. at 663 n.7.
108. Id. at 665.
109. Id. at 663.
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whether Section 546(e) bars the Trustee's claims." 110 Decrying
the text of the provisions, describing it as having "circuitous verbi-
age" which "cryptically defines" the term "'settlement pay-
ment,'" the court held that this "circular definition" lacked the
"'plain meaning' " the former stockholders urged would preclude
further inquiry by this court."'
Instead, the court resorted to the legislative history of
§ 546(e)," 12 and found that the lawmakers' chief concern in enact-
ing the statute was that the clearance and settlement process of
the securities industry remain unaffected when one of the linked
parties filed for bankruptcy. 1 3 Drawing a critical distinction from
that objective to the instant case, the court held that requiring
these defendants to return any payments they received from the
Wieboldt LBO "poses no significant threat to those in the clear-
ance and settlement chain."' " 4 No intermediary in that linkage
"would be meaningfully affected" if the court ordered an avoid-
ance of the LBO transfers.1
5
In a historical postscript, Wieboldt was settled on the eve of
the trial of the fraudulent conveyance action. 116 "[Tihe principal
shareholders who reaped profits in . . . and the directors who
approved [the LBO] have agreed to return about $11.7 million to
the bankrupt estate," said reported accounts." 7 Wieboldt was
over, but it proved to be the watershed for the bringing of similar
fraudulent conveyance suits on this issue.
V. THE CREDITORS GAIN ON THE LBOs
The next landmark decision in this realm was entered by the
eminent District Judge Lasker in Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc.
v. Lewis." 8 The plaintiff was the subject of an LBO in 1987, and
the defendants were its stockholders prior to that time. 1 9 In late
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Raleigh, 131 B.R. at 663-64.
113. Id. at 664.
114. Id. (footnote omitted).
115. Id. at 664-65. In composing his rationale, Judge Holderman concluded:
Thus, although the legislative history of Section 546(e) is not dispositive per se of
whether the section bars the Trustees [sic] claims, the section's legislative
history, when combined with consideration of the system which Section 546(e)
was designed to protect, convince this court that Section 546(e) does not bar the
Trustee's claims against the [LBO] defendants.
Id. at 665 (footnote omitted).
116. Debra L. Moss, Wieboldt's LBO Suit Settled, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1992, at 31.
117. Id.
118. 129 B.R. 992 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
119. Crowthers McCall Pattern, Inc. v. Lewis, 129 B.R. 992, 995 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
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1988, Crowthers was unable to pay its debts as they became due,
and it filed for reorganization pursuant to Chapter 11 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.' 2
As summarized by the court at the outset, "[t]his case con-
cerns the rights of creditors.., to seek compensation from partici-
pants in the sale of the corporation when the debt assumed by that
corporation as a result of the sale renders it unable to meets its
financial obligations.' 2 ' The creditor committee that filed the
action on behalf of Crowthers alleged, inter alia, that the LBO was
a fraudulent conveyance, and that the defendants had breached
their fiduciary duties as directors of the company, along with com-
mitting various other transgressions of corporate law.
122
The instant matter came before the court as a motion brought
by certain defendants to dismiss the action as to them. 23 Essen-
tially, Crowthers had alleged that the conveyances made and obli-
gations incurred by it in connection with the LBO were actually
and constructively fraudulent because the debtor did not receive
fair consideration, was rendered insolvent or was left with an
unreasonably small amount of capital as a result of the
transaction. 
24
After a preliminary dismissal of the complaint against certain
peripheral defendants due to the insufficiency of the pleadings
made against them by the plaintiff,125 the court turned its atten-
tion to one of the principal defendants, Bankers Trust. 126 The
merchant bank had supplied a $15 million bridge loan to help
finance the LBO.'
27
Bankers Trust defended its actions on the basis that it had not
received any property or obligation from Crowthers that could be
restored or annulled, and that the extension of its bridge loan con-
stituted fair consideration to the debtor in the LBO. As to the fair
consideration issue, the debtor retorted that the proceeds of the
bridge loans, the liability which Crowthers assumed, went to the
shareholders who sold their shares in the corporation and not to
Indeed, the defendant Lewis was none other than Reginald Lewis, one of the top
dealmakers of the "Roaring Eighties," probably known best for his participation in the
Beatrice Foods transactions.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 994-95.
122. Id. at 995. Such transgressions by the defendants included impermissible
dividends, payments, and authorized redemption of stock. Id.
123. Id.
124. Crowthers, 129 B.R. at 995-96.
125. Id. at 996-97.
126. Id. at 997.
127. Id.
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Crowthers. 1 28
After briefly examining the laws of the forum defining fraudu-
lent conveyances, Judge Lasker turned to Wieboldt,129  and
focused on its findings that 1) LBOs reduce the assets available to
pay general creditors and 2) that the phases of an LBO should be
"treated as one transaction."' 130 Likewise citing the similar hold-
ing of the Third Circuit in Tabor Court, the district court in
Crowthers characterized the instant LBO as "one integrated trans-
action, the ultimate result of which was to impose additional debt
of $35 million on Crowthers..., for which Crowthers ... received
nothing in exchange. "131
Refuting Bankers Trust's assertion that it was not liable
because it made its loan to a nondebtor intermediary within the
LBO's structure, the court found that the intermediary acted
"essentially as a conduit" for funneling the loan proceeds to the
divesting shareholders. The court concluded that while others
did, Crowthers itself "did not receive the substantive benefits of
the loan."11 32 For all these reasons, the court refused to dismiss the
fraudulent conveyance lawsuit against Bankers Trust and certain
other defendants.
133
At this juncture, it can be seen how the early cases of Tabor
Court and its brethren gave birth to the breakthrough decision of
Wieboldt, followed shortly thereafter by Crowthers. The latter
128. Id.
129. Crowthers, 129 B.R. at 997.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 998 (citing United States v. Tabor Court Realty Corp., 803 F.2d 1288 (3d
Cir. 1986).
132. Id. Judge Lasker opined:
Under these circumstances, it would be inappropriate for the court in
determining the rights of creditors of the corporation to turn a blind eye to the
fact that the loan proceeds were merely passed through the corporation to the
shareholders. In evaluating the applicability of fraudulent conveyance laws
designed to protect creditors' rights, it is essential to view the transaction or
transactions in question from the perspective of creditors. A leveraged buyout
(i.e., the sale of a corporation in which at least part of the purchase price is
obtained through debt assumed by the corporation) such as the one at issue here
can harm creditors in exactly the way fraudulent conveyance laws are designed
to prevent. Accordingly, under the fraudulent conveyance laws, a lender is
required to make a reasonable determination that the buyout is consistent with
the rights of creditors before advancing funds. Where, as here, it is alleged that
the lenders knew that Crowthers Pattern would not receive the loan proceeds
but would nevertheless assume responsibility for repaying the debt, and it is
alleged that the eventual insolvency and bankruptcy of Crowthers Pattern was a
foreseeable result of the leveraged buyout, the plaintiff has adequately pleaded a
cause of action for fraudulent conveyance.
Crowthers, 129 B.R. at 998 (citation omitted). Notably, the court continued to borrow from
the Wieboldt and Tabor Court "collapsed LBO" models in later finding that various other
causes of action were sustainable. ld. at 999-1001.
133. Id. at 1003.
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pair of cases exemplify a devastating one-two punch to failed
LBOs, especially with respect to Wieboldt, where the court's rul-
ing forced capitulation by the LBO participants. Yet the final
knockout blows were yet to be delivered by the circuit courts. Fit-
tingly, it proved again to be the Ninth and Third Circuits, who put
the capstone on the legal dogma to which they had given birth in
Kupetz and Tabor Court.
VI. THE CIRCUITS SPEAK
A. THE THIRD CIRCUIT-METRO
In Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc.,"' the
debtor Metro was the target of a leveraged buyout financed by
Mellon Bank.13 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ulti-
mately reversed and remanded a lower court finding that the LBO
constituted a fraudulent conveyance, 136 primarily because of a
"sparse" record and the "surprisingly cavalier" rulings made
below.' 37 Nonetheless, the legal principles espoused by the tribu-
nal in Metro represent its continued adherence to the embryonic
precepts set forth in the seminal case of Tabor Court.
Writing for the court, Circuit Judge Rosenn found that the
appeal, which was rooted "in the congenial climate of mergers and
acquisitions that beguiled corporate America during the decade of
the nineteen-eighties," raised vital questions regarding a bank-
ruptcy trustee's power to avoid LBO transfers pursuant to the
fraudulent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. 38 The
Third Circuit initially demonstrated some reluctance in making
modern LBOs subject to attack pursuant to centuries-old fraudu-
lent conveyance law.1 39 Nevertheless, the tribunal forged ahead.
Judge Rosenn opined:
134. 945 F.2d 635 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992).
135. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Metro Communications, Inc., 945 F.2d 635, 638 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1476 (1992).
136. Id. at 650, rev'g and remanding, 95 B.R. 921 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989). See also In
re Metro Communications, Inc., 135 B.R. 17 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1989) (amending 95 B.R. 921),
aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 135 B.R. 15 (W.D. Pa. 1991).
137. Metro, 945 F.2d at 649.
138. Id. at 637-38.
139. Id. at 645. The court stated:
At first glance, it seems difficult to reconcile the original purpose of the
fraudulent conveyance laws with what has become a common, arms-length
transaction-the leveraged buyout, or in business parlance, the LBO. Where
there exists no intentional fraud, setting aside the security interest of a lender
who has indisputably given reasonably equivalent value, cash for a promise to
repay a loan, appears to be a patent anomaly.
Id. (emphasis in original).
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Nonetheless, a thorough understanding of the typical
LBO transaction reveals that there is a potential for abuse
of the debtor's creditors, particularly those who are
unsecured, when a company is purchased through an
LBO.
The effect of an LBO is that a corporation's share-
holders are replaced by secured creditors. Put simply,
stockholders' equity is supplanted by corporate debt. The
level of risk facing the newly structured corporation rises
significantly due to the increased debt to equity ratio.
This added risk is borne primarily by the unsecured credi-
tors, those who will most likely not be paid in the event of
bankruptcy. The lender, which normally assumes a
senior, secured position vis-a-vis other creditors, is at risk
only to the extent that the loan is under-collateralized.
An LBO may be attractive to the buyer, seller, and lender
because the structure of the transaction could allow all
parties to the buyout to shift most of the risk of loss to
other creditors of the corporation if the provisions of sec-
tion 548(aX2) were not applied.
14
The tribunal astutely observed that virtually everyone bene-
fits in an LBO: the selling stockholders cash out, usually at a pre-
mium for their shares; the acquiror achieves ownership of the
target; and the lender profits by charging the higher interest rates
and fees usually associated with leveraged buyouts. 14 1 But as for
the target corporation, it receives no direct benefit to offset the
great risk of now operating as a highly leveraged corporation.' 42
For these reasons, the Third Circuit held that the laws of
fraudulent conveyances were available to avoid LBO transactions.
The court found that:
[B]ecause the fraudulent conveyance laws are intended to
protect the debtor's creditors, a lender cannot hide
behind the position, although sympathetic, that it had
parted with reasonable value. The purpose of the laws is
estate preservation; thus, the question whether the
debtor received reasonable value must be determined
from the standpoint of the creditors.'
43
140. Id. at 645-46.
141. Id. at 646.
142. Metro, 945 F.2d at 646.
143. Id. (emphasis in original).
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Moreover, the tribunal found "no exception for the leveraged
buyout transaction" in § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code. 1 4 4 The stat-
ute applied to any transfer, the circuit judges held, for the "defini-
tional language is sufficiently broad to encompass a leveraged
buyout transaction that falls within its terms. ' 145 By these words,
the Third Circuit completed the evolution of its jurisprudence that
now bridged the egregious facts of Tabor Court to an application
of the laws of fraudulent conveyance to a modern failed LBO in
Metro on this vital controversy.
B. THE NINTH CIRCUIT-CITY BANK
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals moved toward applying
fraudulent conveyance law to LBOs in Lippi v. City Bank.14 In
City Bank, Russell decided to buy out his partners in a construc-
tion materials wholesaling business. The transaction was struc-
tured so that Russell and a shell corporation, created for purposes
of the buyout, would purchase the shares of the selling owners.
147
The bulk of Russell's funding was provided by City Bank,
which secured the loan by taking a security interest in all of the
debtor's assets. Importantly, the trustee asserted that it would
seem that the creation of this new liability had the immediate
effect of shifting the debtor's net worth from positive to nega-
tive.1 48  It was also alleged that the parties knew that the LBO
would devastate the debtor's net worth, an appearance that City
144. Id.
145. Id. This proposition was cited with approval by the Third Circuit in Moody v.
Security Pac. Business Credit, Inc., 971 F.2d 1056, 1064 n.10 (3d Cir. 1992) rev'd on other
grounds, 127 B.R. 958 (W.D. Pa. 1991). "This conclusion" opined the panel, "is consistent
with that reached by the other courts that have considered the applicability of the
fraudulent conveyance provisions of the UFCA to leveraged buyouts." Id. (citing inter alia,
Crowthers and Wieboldt).
Although the tribunal found the leveraged buyout in Moody not to be a fraudulent
conveyance, it did so on very different facts which conclusively demonstrated that the
debtor was not rendered insolvent in any sense by the LBO. Id. at 1074. Additionally, over
ninety percent of the proof of claims filed by trade creditors in the case were for goods or
services provided a year after the leveraged buyout was consummated. Id. "[W]e do not
believe," opined Circuit Judge Scirica, "[the debtor's] insolvency was a natural consequence
of the leveraged buyout." Id. at 1075-76.
Paramount to this analysis, the Third Circuit confirmed its view, as stated in Metro, that
"leveraged buyouts present great potential for abuse.... Therefore, we believe failed
leveraged buyouts merit close scrutiny under the fraudulent conveyance laws." Moody, 971
F.2d at 1073 (emphasis added). The tribunal repeatedly cited Metro and Tabor Court,
leaving no doubt that those cases and the legal principles espoused therein retain their
vitality in such controversies, and the instant case reached a different result solely by virtue
of its unique facts.
146. 955 F.2d 599 (9th Cir. 1992).
147. Lippi v. City Bank, 955 F.2d 599, 601 (9th Cir. 1992).
148. Id. at 602.
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Bank sought to avoid.' 49
A Chapter 7 bankruptcy followed, and the trustee com-
menced the instant adversary proceeding to recover the LBO pay-
out as a fraudulent transfer. 50 The district court below granted
summary judgment in favor of City Bank and certain other
defendants. However, the district court, despite a jury verdict
against Russell at trial, refused to enter an order of judgment void-
ing the LBO transfers."'
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.5 2 Rel-
evant to this discussion is the panel's conclusion that, should the
finder of fact determine on remand that the various transfers con-
stituted but one integrated transition, "the component transfers
are also avoidable" as fraudulent conveyances.' 5 3 Critical to the
opinion was the comparison the court drew to Tabor Court.
As with the latter case, the Ninth Circuit found that the LBO
lender was intimately involved with the formulation of the
arrangement, whereby the proceeds of the City Bank loan were
directed into the hands of the LBO participants. 54 The panel also
cleared the way for recovery from the selling shareholders. Writ-
ing for the court, Circuit Judge Fletcher noted that the tribunal
had previously held in Kupetz that the formal structure of an LBO
should be respected. 5
However, the appellate court opined that "where there is evi-
dence that the parties knew of or should have known that the
transaction would deplete the assets of the company, the court will
look beyond this formal structure."'5 6 Indeed, the circuit judges
gave tacit approval to the Wieboldt approach of collapsing the
149. Id. at 602 n.3.
150. Id. at 603.
151. Id. at 604.
152. City Bank, 955 F.2d at 614.
153. Id. at 610.
154. Id. The tribunal also found that City Bank was an "initial transferee" of the loan
repayments, within the meaning of § 550 of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus the trustee
could recover from the lender if the transfer was avoided. Id. at 610-11. See also 11 U.S.C.
§ 550. Section 550 provides, in pertinent part, that:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, to the extent that a
transfer is avoided under section 544, 545, 547, 548, 549, 553(b), or 724(a) of this
title, the trustee may recover, for the benefit of the estate, the property
transferred, or, if the court so orders, the value of such property, from
(1) the initial transferee of such transfer or the entity for whose benefit
such transfer was made; or
(2) any immediate or mediate transferee of such initial transferee.
11 U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
155. City Bank, 955 F.2d at 612.
156. Id.
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LBO into one unified transaction for purposes of this analysis.' 57
Given that the evidence adduced at the district court was conflict-
ing, the appellate court ruled that the summary judgment order
refusing to undo the LBO was improper since some evidence
existed that the LBO might have to be collapsed.' 58 The appellate
court thereby opened the door to the application of fraudulent
conveyance law.1 59
In sum, Metro and City Bank are the appropriate pillars of
authority for the proposition that failed LBOs can be subjected to
the laws of fraudulent conveyance in a bankruptcy case. These
tribunals initiated the doctrine with Kupetz and Tabor Court, gen-
erating the landmarks of Wieboldt and Crowthers, and now
brought all of it together with their two most recent decisions. It is
this view which now predominates.
VII. OPPOSITION FROM THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Notwithstanding all the above, the instant controversy regard-
ing the application of fraudulent conveyance law to modern LBOs
remains unresolved. An internecine conflict has arisen, with an
opposing vanguard coming from the Tenth Circuit. Taking a
markedly different approach, that tribunal has not engaged the
controversy frontally, but has instead flanked as if on a completely
different basis. Rather than fully decide if failed LBOs are subject
to unwinding by the law of fraudulent conveyances, this appellate
court has reached inapposite results by relying upon a statutory
protection that, in its view, makes payouts in an LBO virtually
untouchable. The following discussion examines this contrary
position.
A. KAISER V. SCHWAB
In a somewhat brief opinion, the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit disposed of the LBO controversy on a rather limited
ground in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co. 1 0 In Kaiser,
the tribunal affirmed the district court's reversal of the bankruptcy
court's denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. 161
The defendant Schwab claimed it was not liable because it was a
157. Id. at 611-12.
158. Id. at 613.
159. Id.
160. 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
161. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 847 (10th Cir. 1990).
See Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc. v. Jacobs (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 110 B.R. 514 (D. Colo
1990), rev'g 105 B.R. 639 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1989).
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"mere conduit" of the LBO payouts rather than a transferee, pur-
suant to the Bankruptcy Code's definition.
16 2
Other moving defendants, stockbrokerages like Schwab,
asserted that the LBO payments were exempt from avoidance as
"settlement payments" under the statutory Code exception. 163
Notably, this fact led the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) to file a brief and participate in oral argument, 164 ostensibly
to argue for the preservation of stability in the stock markets.
65
The tribunal specified that it did not reach the conduit ques-
tion raised by Schwab. Rather, it affirmed the district court solely
on the "settlement payment" issue. 166 Writing for the panel, Cir-
cuit Judge Anderson began by noting that a trustee or debtor-in-
possession cannot avoid a settlement payment. 16 7 The definition
of a settlement payment, 68 while admittedly somewhat circular,
is nevertheless extremely broad. 16 9 For that reason, the Tenth
Circuit ruled that "it clearly includes anything which may be con-
sidered a settlement payment.' 170 The transfer of the considera-
tion in the Kaiser LBO was therefore a settlement payment under
this pervasive definition.' 7 ' The tribunal added that such an inter-
pretation is consistent with the legislative intent to protect the
nation's financial markets from any instability that might be
caused by the reversal of concluded securities trades pursuant to a
bankruptcy trustee's statutory avoiding powers. 72 Notwithstand-
ing that "[n]either LBOs nor other exceptional transactions were
ever mentioned" in the legislative history of the relevant Code
provisions, the tribunal opined "it would be an act of judicial legis-
lation" to establish such an exemption for a LBO transfer from the
settlement payment definition now. 1
7 3
Summarizing for the tribunal, Judge Anderson pointed out
162. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846, 848 & n.2. See 11
U.S.C. § 550(a) (1988).
163. Schwab, 913 F.2d at 848 & n.2. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
164. Schwab, 913 F.2d at 850 n.7.
165. Id. at 849-50.
166. Id. at 848.
167. Id. at 848 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (1988)).
168. See 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (1988).
169. Schwab, 913 F.2d at 848 (citing Bevill, Bressler & Schulman Asset Management
Corp. v. Spencer Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Bevill, Bressler & Schulman Asset Management
Corp.), 878 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1989)). It must be noted that the "ultimate question" the
Third Circuit decided was a controversy involving the transfer of federal government
securities repurchase agreements with a defunct stockbrokerage under § 546(f), not a failed
LBO, and not under the purview of § 546(e). Bevill, 878 F.2d at 743.
170. Schwab, 913 F.2d at 848.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 850.
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that: "The LBO was a securities transaction. The transfer of
money and preferred stock was the settlement of that transaction.
Therefore, the transfers to Schwab were exempt from avoidance
under section 546(e) as 'settlement payment[s] . . . to a . . .
stockbroker.' "174
As stated previously, the Tenth Circuit's approach left certain
questions, such as the "conduit" question, explicitly unanswered.
Left implicitly unanswered was the question of the application of
fraudulent conveyance law to leveraged buyouts. That was not to
be for long, however, as the panel was soon compelled to return to
this very same proceeding.
B. KAISER V. PEARL
In Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel
Corp. ),175 the inevitable question presented was the one the Tenth
Circuit left unresolved in Schwab: "whether consideration paid to
shareholders for their stock in connection with a leveraged buy
out is exempt from the avoiding powers of a trustee ... as 'settle-
ment payments ..... 176 The Kaiser caption was a virtual indict-
ment of Wall Street, naming practically every brokerage firm in
the Western World, 1 7 followed by an equally lengthy list of their
respective counsel.1 7 8 Moreover, the SEC again filed a brief and
participated in the oral argument of the case.
17 9
As introduced by the court, this case involved "a leveraged
buy out gone bad."' 8 0 The debtor now sought to retrieve the
monies paid to its former shareholders in connection with
the LBO by making "the relatively novel yet increasingly popular
claim that these payments constitute[d] a fraudulent
conveyance." 8 1
174. Id. (footnote omitted). Indeed, the appellate court also refuted the debtor's
assertion that its shares were not securities, because the LBO entailed a delisting of Kaiser
shares from the New York Stock Exchange. Id. at 850 n.8. The panel reasoned:
The shares were securities when the parties agreed to the LBO. A technical
change in how Kaiser regarded them after the merger should not obscure the
more sensible interpretation of the transaction: that the owners of Kaiser Steel
sold their common stock for cash and preferred stock. That LBOs of publicly-
traded companies are securities transactions is shown by the fact that they are
within the purview of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
Id.
175. 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992).
176. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230,
1235 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3015 (1992).
177. Id. at 1230-32.
178. Id. at 1233-35.
179. Id. at 1235 n.1.
180. Id. at 1235.
181. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1235.
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Nonetheless, posed Circuit Judge Anderson, writing for the
tribunal again, "[t]he current battle is much more narrow," as it
pertains solely to the construction of a bankruptcy law statute that
prohibits a debtor from avoiding settlement payments "made by
or to stockbrokers, financial institutions, and clearing agencies.'
'1 8 2
In Pearl, both the defendants and the SEC agreed that this exemp-
tion "encompasses amounts paid to the shareholders in the
LBO and accordingly prevents Kaiser from unwinding their
transaction."1
3
Describing the LBO itself, the opinion relates that in late
1983, the Kaiser board of directors in fact agreed to the LBO.
Under the plan, the Kaiser Steel Corporation would be merged
with a new entity that was owned by a group of outside investors.
Upon the effectuation of the merger, all of the outstanding shares
of Kaiser common stock would be converted into the right to
receive two shares of preferred stock and twenty-two dollars-the
LBO consideration-in the surviving entity. The source of fund-
ing, which amounted to $162 million, was to come from Kaiser's
cash reserves and from a $100 million loan from a financial institu-
tion. The $100 million loan was secured by the target corpora-
tion's assets. 1
84
The proposed LBO was approved by the shareholders on Jan-
uary 18, 1984. As of February 29, 1984, the effective date of the
merger, the former Kaiser common stock shareholders were
required to tender the shares they held to Kaiser's disbursing
agent, Bank of America, in order to receive the cash and preferred
stock. The stock was delisted by the New York Stock Exchange
the following day.'8 "
The Depository Trust Company (DTC), a securities clearing
agency acting as depository, was in possession of most of the com-
mon stock. Following the merger, DTC received the payments of
the LBO consideration upon tendering the stock certificates to
Bank of America. DTC subsequently transferred these payments
to the accounts of its participants, which included brokers and
other financial intermediaries. In turn, these intermediaries either
retained the payments if they themselves were the beneficial own-
ers, or disbursed the payments to their customers, who were the
beneficial owners of Kaiser stock. A number of shares were
182. Id.
183. Id. at 1236.
184. Id. at 1235-36.
185. Id.
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exchanged through securities clearing agencies other than DTC,
and since DTC stopped trading in Kaiser shares prior to the date
the LBO became effective, some beneficial owners and financial
intermediaries were required to tender their shares to Bank of
America directly. 8"
Kaiser filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Code in
1987 and filed the instant fraudulent conveyance action, seeking
to recover the $162 million. The test case of Schwab followed.
Pending the Schwab appeal, in consolidated proceedings before
the district court, other financial intermediaries moved for sum-
mary judgment on the basis of the § 546(e) settlement payment
exemption. 1
8 7
The district court granted summary judgment, dismissing all
of the claims asserted against the financial intermediaries, and on
its own motion, dismissed the claims asserted against the remain-
ing defendants. The remaining defendants included the beneficial
shareholders of Kaiser stock, as well as brokers trading on their
own account.' 88
In light of the decision in Schwab, Kaiser abandoned all the
claims against the defendants in the case insofar as they had func-
tioned in conduit/financial intermediary capacities. Therefore, all
the defendants remaining before the circuit court were either bro-
kers or shareholders that were the beneficial owners of the Kaiser
shares tendered in connection with the LBO.' 8 9
Positing the precise issue before the tribunal, Judge Anderson
wrote that the Tenth Circuit was called upon to decide if its hold-
ing in Schwab should be extended to provide protection for pay-
ments made to beneficial shareholders.' 90 The debtor insisted that
first, the LBO payments were not true settlement payments, and
second, that even if they were, the statutory exception of § 546(e)
protected a recipient only to the extent it was a participant in the
securities clearance and settlement system-in other words, a
stockbroker, clearinghouse or the like. 19 1 A true shareholder was
not protected by the statutory exception, asserted Kaiser.'
9 2
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit could not accept
186. Id. at 1236.
187. Id.




192. Id. at 1236-37.
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the debtor's argument. Its analysis began with the statutory lan-
guage itself:
Section 546(e) refers to section 741(8) for the defini-
tion of "settlement payment." Section 741(8), in turn,
defines "settlement payment" as a "preliminary settle-
ment payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim
settlement payment, a settlement payment on account, a
final settlement payment, or any other similar payment
commonly used in the securities trade.'
93
The court noted that a natural reading suggested that the defini-
tion of settlement payment was "extremely broad.' 94 Moreover,
the court found that the law's "clear aim" was to be all encompass-
ing in setting forth what constituted a settlement payment.' 95
The tribunal's task, opined Judge Anderson, was to apply the
Bankruptcy Code terminology "according to its plain mean-
ing. "196 In this particular context, the court added, it "must inter-
pret the term 'settlement payment' as it is plainly understood
within the securities industry.'
'1 97
By way of explanation, the court described that, with respect
to the routine purchase and sale of a security, the opportunity for
settlement occurred on at least two occasions. The first, a "street-
side settlement," occurred between the brokers and the clearing
agency during the clearance and settlement process. The brokers'
transactions are matched and compared upon submission. Con-
firmed contracts are submitted to the clearing agency's accounting
functions. The obligations produced under the individual trades
are netted to determine each clearing member's "settlement obli-
gations." The second opportunity for settlement is on the "settle-
ment date," generally five days after the trade date. The brokers
and the clearing agency, which have interposed themselves
between the buying broker and the selling broker, will deliver
securities and receive payment. " 'Settlement payments' are those
payments made in discharge of a party's settlement obliga-
193. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1237 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 741(8)) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis
in original).
194. Id. (citations omitted). See also Schwab, 913 F.2d at 848.
195. Id. (citations omitted).
196. Id. This comports with the Supreme Court's recent edicts that the bankruptcy
statutes be given their plain meaning when under judicial review. See United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989), followed by Connecticut Nat'l Bank v.
Germain, 60 U.S.L.W. 4222 (U.S. March 9, 1992).
197. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1237. See Shell Oil Co. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 488 U.S. 19,
25 (1988); McCarthy v. Bronson, 111 S. Ct. 1737, 1740 (1991) (stating that "statutory
language must always be read in its proper context.").
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tions."' 98 Additionally, a" 'customer-side settlement' " also occurs
between the customer and its broker.19 9 Logically, the term "set-
tlement payment" can be used to describe those payments made
to settle a customer's account with its broker as well.
20 0
As pointed out by the court, none of the parties argued that a
shareholder could never make or receive a settlement payment
with regard to routine securities purchases.20 ' Rather, the debtor
had argued that the Bankruptcy Code's usage of the term applied
to shareholders exclusively for normal securities purchases and
sales, "not an extraordinary securities transaction like the lever-
aged buy out."
20 2
The panel, as it had in Schwab, agreed that Kaiser's position
was not without merit. "However, we continue to note," wrote
Judge Anderson, "that while Congress might have chosen other-
wise, neither section 546(e) or [sic] section 741(8) is on its face lim-
ited to 'securities contracts,' as defined by the Code.. .. " Indeed,
the court remarked that Congress had previously demonstrated
"itself capable of restricting the counterparts of § 546(e) to a par-
ticular type of transaction.
20 3
The panel set forth its raison d'etre as follows:
Given the wide scope and variety of securities trans-
actions, we will not interpret the term "settlement pay-
ment" so narrowly as to exclude the exchange of stock for
consideration in an LBO. As the appellees and the SEC
have urged, there is no reason to narrow the plain con-
cept of "settlement" to a single type of securities transac-
198. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1237-38 (citations omitted). See DIVISION OF MARKET
REGULATION, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, THE OCTOBER 1987 MARKET
BREAK 10-5 (1988) (hereinafter SEC REPORT); Dale A. Oesterle, Comment on the Harris
Paper, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 943, 944 (1989) ("Settlement payments refer to the final
payment of funds between clearing house [members] for trade[s] registered up to a specific
point in time.").
199. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1238. See SEC REPORT, supra note 198, at 10-2, 10-10 to 10-
11. Settlement is defined as the " '[c]onclusion of a securities transaction when a customer
pays a broker/dealer for securities purchased or delivers securities sold and receives from
the broker the proceeds of a sale.'" Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1238 (quoting NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE, LANGUAGE OF INVESTING GLOSSARY 30 (1981)). JERRY M. ROSENBERG, THE
INVESTOR'S DICTIONARY (1986) (defining settlement day as "the deadline by which a
purchaser of stock must pay for what has been bought and the seller must deliver the
certificates for the securities that have been sold.").
200. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1238.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1238-39 & n.7.
203. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1239 n.8. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(f) (1988) (referring to settlement
payments "made by or to a repo participant, in connection with a repurchase agreement
....") (emphasis added); 11 U.S.C. § 546(g) (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (referring to "transfer[s]
made by or to a swap participant, in connection with a swap agreement .... ) (emphasis
added).
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tion. The Code has been expanded to explicitly cover five
different types of financial transactions, all of which, with
the exception of swap agreements, involve "settlement
payments" of one form or another. In fact, the definition
of "settlement payment" found in § 741(8) also applies to
payments made in connection with a repurchase agree-
ment, which is not a "trade" entered into on an exchange,
and which involves a completely different settlement
process.
While the leveraged buy out may not be a "routine"
securities trade, at least as viewed by Kaiser, we cannot
deny what in substance took place here. The LBO was a
securities transaction, varying only in form from the vari-
ous other ways in which a shareholder's equity interest
can be sold. The former Kaiser Steel shareholders effec-
tively sold their equity interests to the new investors in
exchange for money and a continuing stake in the new
entity as preferred shareholders. In settlement of that
transaction, the Kaiser Steel shareholders tendered their
shares and received payment. These payments were
"settlement payments. "204
Moreover, the tribunal found that it also achieved an equita-
ble treatment for all shareholders of Kaiser, both pre- and post-
LBO:
[T]hose shareholders who tendered their shares one day
after the LBO and received the LBO consideration are
treated just the same under the Code as shareholders who
sold their shares in the market one day prior to the LBO
and received a settlement payment reflecting the market
value of the LBO consideration. Neither type of investor
will be forced to disgorge the payments several years
later.2 o5
The Tenth Circuit added parenthetically that "this symmetry
of treatment" for public shareholders was justified by "the plain
notion of 'settlement,' " as well as the Congressional policy of pro-
204. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1239-40 (citations omitted).
205. Id. at 1240 (footnote omitted). See also Jonas v. Resolution Trust Corp. (In re
Comark), 971 F.2d 322 (9th Cir. 1992). Just as the Third Circuit in Bevill, Bressler &
Schulman Asset Management Corp. v. Spencer Say. & Loan Ass'n (In re Bevill), 878 F.2d
742 (3d Cir. 1989), the Ninth Circuit was dealing strictly with "reverse repo" transactions
and not suprisingly, reached the same result as to the interpretation of the term
"settlement payment" found in § 741 of the Code.
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moting speed and finality in commercial transactions, a view par-
ticularly espoused by the SEC in the instant proceedings.2 °6 To be
sure, according to the panel, the "public" shareholder includes a
brokerage firm trading for its own account.20 7
Lastly, the tribunal looked to the "by or to" argument made
by Kaiser, that § 546(e) only protects a settlement payment made
by or to a party in the clearance and settlement system, and not
ordinary shareholders. 20 8 Again, the circuit judges rejected the
debtor's argument:
On its face the statute is clear. The statute exempts
payments made "by or to" a stockbroker, financial institu-
tion, or clearing agency. Again, unless there is some rea-
son to believe the clear application is absurd or otherwise
unreasonable, we can leave our inquiry at that. 0 9
Of greater import was that the panel's plain language rationale for
the holding above was the significant policy concern it alluded to:
Certainly, we cannot say that the clear application is
absurd, given the fact that disruption in the securities
industry-an inevitable result if leveraged buy outs can
freely be unwound years after they occurred-is also a
harm the statute was designed to avoid. Accordingly, we
must reject Kaiser's argument.
210
Clearly, the paramount concern implicit in this conclusion
was the disruption of the stock exchanges by the subsequent bank-
ruptcies of companies that had previously been the subject of
leveraged buyouts. In dispensing a passing glimmer of hope, the
Tenth Circuit added that, while its holding was broad in its appli-
cation, and certainly foreclosed Kaiser's prayer for relief as made
herein, remedies by way of suit for damages against specific indi-
viduals or institutions for unlawful acts were still available. 21'
C. SUPREME COURT REVIEW-AN UNFULFILLED NEED
The denial of certiorari in Kaiser has exposed a wide rift in the
circuits, surely one destined to plague an already troubled bank-
ruptcy court system in these recessionary times. Lack of review
206. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1240 n.10.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1240.
209. Id. (emphasis in original).
210. Id. at 1241 (citation omitted). See Schwab, 913 F.2d at 848-49.
211. Kaiser, 952 F.2d at 1241.
1993]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
by the high court has left unanswered the many questions raised
by the Kaiser appellants, which are in fact some of the very open
issues that have plagued this interaction between the Bankruptcy
Code and LBOs.
The petition for certiorari asserted that the Tenth Circuit
effectively turned the Bankruptcy Code on its head by preferring
equity for debt. Section 546(e) was intended to address other con-
cerns, and it was a novel interpretation indeed for the appeals
court to apply it to forbid the trustee from avoiding transfers made
as part of an LBO pay out. 2 12 By thus absolving the securities
industry of liability, the appellant argued, the Tenth Circuit has
"'license[d] corporate raiders.., to plunder corporate assets.' -213
Indeed, such a crucial point should not go without a response from
the nation's highest court.
Pointing to, inter alia, the fact that the text of the law did not
explicitly name equity shareholders therein, the petitioners had
contended that settlement payments did not include one-time
redemptions of stock or cash mergers where assets are distributed
to stockholders. In short, § 546(e) was designed to protect the
chain of facilitators in security trades, rather than to prevent
the recovery of improper corporate distributions made to
shareholders. 14
Raising a telling public policy argument, of which the
Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter, the appellants charged that
the Tenth Circuit's decision condones similar excesses in other
failed LBO bankruptcies. If left standing, petitioners contended
that the tribunal's ruling would insulate profiteering shareholders
from liability while the debt-ridden companies they created fail,
leaving numerous creditor constituencies foundering. Among
others, the losers in this exchange include retirees, health plan
beneficiaries, and the Pension Benefits Guaranty Corporation,
along with ordinary creditors. At their significant expense, it was
argued, the LBO participants gained handsomely while leaving in
their wake a decrepit company unable to meet its obligations. The
problem will only worsen if this incorrect view of the law is not
corrected, claimed the petitioners, and recovery from the benefi-
ciaries of LBO transfers are permitted to go forward pursuant to
212. Trustee Should Be Allowed To Avoid Distribution Made In Kaiser Steel LBO, 4
BANKR. L. REP. (BNA) No. 19, at 560 (May 7, 1992).
213. Id.
214. Id. at 561.
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the laws governing fraudulent conveyances.215 Only time will tell
if the petitioner's dire forecasts will come true. In any event, the
lack of a clear resolution is disquieting and will only foment more
litigation on the bankrupt LBO issue.
In brief, the Tenth Circuit avoided addressing the instant con-
troversy in the manner undertaken by the courts in Wieboldt and
Crowthers, as well as the Third and Ninth Circuits in Metro and
City Bank, respectively. Rather, the Kaiser panel has espoused
two opinions which operate in the limited range of "settlement
payments," and the statutory exemption from the trustee's avoid-
ing powers supposedly ends the query. It leaves one to wonder if
such holdings by that tribunal would have withstood substantive
scrutiny from the Supreme Court. Moreover, the salient fact
remains that the Schwab and Kaiser decisions represent a tremen-
dous break from the persuasive majority of courts which have con-
sidered the issue of failed LBOs in the context of bankruptcy
proceedings. It is regrettable that the high court chose not to test
the holdings of the Tenth Circuit.
VIII. ANALYSIS
Considering the state of the decisional law today, it is appar-
ent that the courts have established a clear trend in proceeding on
this issue. It would seem a foregone conclusion that leveraged
buyouts shall be considered susceptible to attack under the Bank-
ruptcy Code and the laws of fraudulent conveyances. Except for
the Tenth Circuit, no tribunal seems willing to carve out an excep-
tion which addresses the problem and bring all LBOs out from
under the penumbra of those statutory provisions.
Wieboldt and its progeny, particularly the circuit cases, exem-
plify an emerging school of judicial thought that refuses to exempt
LBOs from the laws of fraudulent conveyances and subsequent
attack in bankruptcy proceedings. In fact, these courts speak cor-
rectly, for no exemption for LBOs exists in any reasonable inter-
pretation of the law of fraudulent conveyances-be it in the
Bankruptcy Code or in any state codification of the UFCA or its
ilk. True to the plain meaning of these statutes, these courts have
dutifully applied them for no defensible position exists for doing
otherwise.
Moreover, these tribunals have rejected the arguments that
exalt form over substance as a reason not to impose fraudulent
215. Id.
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conveyance law upon failed LBOs. To say a leveraged buyout is a
complex financing mechanism is to woefully understate the case.
But judges need not fear LBOs for this reason, and if the substance
demands that their many strata be collapsed into one unified trans-
action, then so be it. The letter of the law insists upon it.
Lastly, the evolution of this line of cases has been a measured
one. From the first exploratory steps of Kupetz and the over-
whelmingly special circumstances of Tabor Court, court after
court gradually built upon the theories espoused previously, and
carefully applied them to the increasingly evident problems pecu-
liar to failed LBOs. This has led to the breakthroughs of the Wie-
boldt and Crowthers landmarks, as well as other contemporary
cases.
It could very well be that it was not mere happenstance for
the Third and Ninth Circuits to revisit the controversy in Metro
and City Bank and thereby put the crowning decisions in place.
One thing is surely evident-as sophisticated as LBOs are, the
jurists unraveling their misfortunes in a subsequent bankruptcy
have been more than up to the task. For this we should be
grateful.
Standing in counterpoise, the pair of decisions from the Tenth
Circuit in the Kaiser bankruptcy are sorely lacking in terms of per-
suasiveness. First, as a matter of legal philosophy exemplified
therein, that tribunal has twice refused to grapple with the issue as
did its sister circuits in Metro and City Bank. This writing does not
fault the worthy panels for deciding the issues as put before them
by the litigants. Nevertheless, the approach taken was simply too
facile, given the magnitude of the problem.
Second, the appellate court's constricted vision of the "settle-
ment payments" exception does not serve the best interests of
either that statutory provision, or the laws of fraudulent convey-
ances, be they companions in the Bankruptcy Code or relations of
state law. The panel committed several errors. It accorded plain
meaning to a statute that is anything but plain. The law has surely
been resoundingly criticized as circular and obtuse. Surely the
plain meaning doctrine loses its positive qualities when applied in
such a blanket fashion.
Given such, the dogma of statutory construction demands an
examination of the law's legislative history. Here the Tenth Cir-
cuit errs again, for the legislative history contains absolutely no
indicia of how this narrow exception should interface with LBO
transactions. The court could have taken judicial notice that the
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dilemma of failed LBOs was simply not an issue at the time, thus
making it highly unlikely that Congress intended to address it. In
fact, the record clearly shows that Congress' simple aim was to
promulgate a general law designed to protect intermediates in the
securities industry's clearance and settlement process. There is
nothing apparent in those well-expressed concerns that could pos-
sibly be expanded upon to claim that Congress intended this statu-
tory exception to immunize LBO transactions from attack as
fraudulent conveyances.
For additional precedent, the Tenth Circuit relies heavily on
the Bevill, Bressler case for its own expansive definition of "settle-
ment payments" and the scope of the exception. However, as
noted hereinabove, 16 the Third Circuit in Bevill, Bessler was fac-
tually distinguishable in that the court was: a) dealing with federal
government securities "repo" agreements, not payouts to the sell-
ing shareholders of an LBO target company; b) confronted with a
defunct brokerage, not a failed LBO under attack as a fraudulent
conveyance; and c) most importantly, the Third Circuit explicitly
decided its proceeding under a different exception to the trustee's
avoiding powers. The Schwab and Kaiser rationales are therefore
seriously misplaced in terms of the common law they both promi-
nently relied upon.
Third and last, the decisions of the Tenth Circuit simply can-
not withstand the pressure of the great weight of authority that
has ruled differently. From Tabor Court to Wieboldt to Metro and
City Bank, and all the cases in between as passed upon by bank-
ruptcy, district, and circuit judges alike, the law as it exists today
demands that failed LBOs in bankruptcy proceedings may be
avoided under federal and state fraudulent conveyance laws. The
crushing onslaught of contrary holdings simply discredits the
minority view of the Tenth Circuit. While this is certainly enough
on its own, it is nevertheless unfortunate that the Supreme Court
declined to review the Tenth Circuit's holding in order to finally
resolve the controversey. One can only hope for the high court's
review via a different appellate trail.
To be sure, the creation of a "safe harbor" for LBOs by way of
statutory revision does not appear to be on the horizon. In fact, in
the recent past, anti-leveraged buyout sentiment flared to levels
close to inciting legislative reform that would have encouraged
fraudulent conveyance lawsuits in failed LBO bankruptcies.
216. See text accompanying supra note 169.
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For instance, prominent bankruptcy judges, among them
Judge Bodoh, the author of the two Ohio Corrugating decisions,2 17
urged the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of
the House Judiciary Committee to extend the existing one-year
"reach-back" period 218 to at least two years, if not longer. 21 9
Repeating the battle cry of the Wieboldt era, that the 1980s' LBOs
are the 1990s' bankruptcies, the jurist urged that the change be
made to conform the federal provisions with the majority of state
fraudulent conveyance laws. As Congress could not have antici-
pated the "'corporate feeding frenzy of LBOs'" when it promul-
gated the Bankruptcy Code in 1978, it should act now in view of
today's realities, said Judge Bodoh.22 °
Certainly, any political movement is relatively quiet these
days, but the sleeping giant can easily be stirred into action. One
must remember that not long ago the Senate Banking Committee
had requested the Treasury Department, the Securities and
Exchange Commission and other regulatory agencies to conduct
an analysis of, among other things, "[w]hether banks that partici-
pate in LBO loans conduct appropriate credit analysis and
whether they are obtaining enough information from borrow-
ers. "221 The SEC, among other agencies, was actively considering
legislative and rulemaking proposals relating to the regulation of
LBOs. 222 A reactivation of these endeavors is not beyond the
realm of possibility in the present politically charged environment.
In view of all of the foregoing, the "players" in the high-stakes
game of leveraged buyouts must now confront the dark reality of
legal intervention. Wieboldt, Metro, and City Bank portend the
day of reckoning for LBOs, as "critics have long complained that
these deals serve little economic purpose beyond enriching man-
agement, underwriters, and lenders, and that the companies have
become so prodigiously leveraged with debt that they could not
withstand a financial storm. 212 3 The majority of courts are follow-
217. See Ohio Corrugating Co. v. Security Pac. Business Credit (In re Ohio Corrugating
Co.), 70 B.R. 920 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1987); Ohio Corrugating Co. v. DPAC, Inc. (In re
Corrugating Co.), 91 B.R. 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1988).
218. Two Bankruptcy Judges Urge Changes To Deal With LBO-Related Problems, 22
Securities Regulation & Law Report (BNA) 767, 767-68 (May 18, 1990).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 768.
221. Letter from Senator Riegle, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, to Chairman Ruder, Securities and Exchange Commission, at 3
(Jan. 6, 1989).
222. Letter of Chairman Ruder, Securities and Exchange Commission, to
Representative Dingell, Chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce
(May 1, 1989).
223. Carol J. Loomis, LBOs Are Taking Their Lumps, FORTUNE, Dec. 7, 1987, at 63.
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ing the Wieboldt rationale in taking the offensive in vindicating
the rights of general creditors injured by the subsequent bank-
ruptcy of an LBO company. Moreover, the presence of such
unwanted scrutiny looms even larger, as the threat of judicial
action is coupled with the uncertainty inherent in an application
of law that has yet to find completely firm footing.
For these reasons, parties who participated in or are contem-
plating involvement in a leveraged buyout, especially lenders
making substantial investments of their capital, should presume
significant risks are present. Those with LBOs still in formative
stages should diligently strive to build a record to validate the
transaction as legitimate in order to fend off an attack that may
come in a bankruptcy court at some future date.
For potential LBO participants, Wieboldt and its predecessors
may also signify that it is time to intensify preventive measures
designed to insulate them from a subsequent attack should the tar-
get company later slip into bankruptcy. Such procedures would
entail the construction of an extensive pre-LBO record, evidenc-
ing careful scrutiny of issues such as the target's solvency, capital
maintenance, cash flow and asset dispositions.
Prospective LBO lenders should in particular assure that the
financial information and projections relating to the target be as
accurate and conservative as possible. 24 This task is more difficult
because of the decree of the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants that accountants may not issue written assurances
regarding a target's solvency or related matters to an LBO
lender. 2 5
As pointed out by one commentator, the virtue of such dili-
gent inquiry is that it compels prospective LBO lenders to evalu-
ate the economic impact of the transaction, and then enables them
to refuse to participate if it appears the buyout will run afoul of the
Bankruptcy Code and fraudulent conveyance law. Given the like-
lihood that the lender who finances a leveraged buyout is in a
superior position to evaluate it, that. party thus assumes the risk of
subsequent litigation if the LBO exceeds the parameters of a
sound transaction. An LBO lender would then take on risk in
equal proportion to the questionable nature of the leveraged
224. David A. Murdoch et al., Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Transfers: Life
After Gleneagles, 43 Bus. LAw. 1, 21.
225. Interpretation of Attestation Standards: Responding to Requests for Reports on
Matters Relating to Solvency, codified at 1 AICPA Professional Standards (CCH) AU
2012.01-.05 (May 1988).
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buyout, but without the imposition of the absolute liability that
would, in effect, make that lender the insurer of the transaction.
226
IX. CONCLUSION
In this last decade of the twentieth century, it would seem
that the highly leveraged buyout is in its nadir. However, we have
yet to crest the wave of failed LBOs and the carnage that they
bring to the bankruptcy court. For this reason, the treatment that
such transactions are accorded in the aftermath of their demise is a
vitally important issue for bankruptcy law today.
There are those who argue that the ultra-modern financing
mechanism of a leveraged buyout should not be subjected to
arcane law that was devised centuries before to deal with
improper transfers of cattle and sheep by agrarian debtors to avoid
the claims of their merchant creditors. Reaching the same result,
but in a totally different way, is the view espoused by a single tri-
bunal that resolves the matter via a questionable interpretation of
a statutory exemption, originally conceived to address a totally dif-
ferent concern.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the majority and better view is
that failed LBOs in bankruptcy proceedings are subject to the full
weight of the laws of fraudulent conveyances. The bulk of the
courts that have decided this vital issue have not uncovered a rea-
son to except such transactions from subsequent attack under
either federal or state fraudulent conveyance laws. Instead, they
have decreed that LBOs can be scrutinized, collapsed into one
transaction, and basically undone, with the massive payouts appur-
tenant thereto reversed and the returned funds made available to
all creditors in a uniform distribution.
This interpretation and application of the law is more than
just a trend. The sole dissenting circuit court is heavily outnum-
bered, notwithstanding that the Supreme Court declined to grant
review. Little legislative activity is in the offering, and what was
once considered was decidedly anti-LBO. Thus, no change is
anticipated on that front. For all these reasons, any party pres-
ently contemplating a leveraged buyout has tremendous legal
ramifications to ponder. As for an existing LBO already embroiled
in bankruptcy or sliding in that unfortunate direction, be fore-
226. Emily L. Sherwin, Creditors' Rights Against Participants In a Leveraged Buyout,
72 MINN. L. REV. 449, 493-96 (1988).
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warned that here, the law of fraudulent conveyances under the
Bankruptcy Code has all the leverage.

